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ACTIONS QUASI IN REM UNDER SECTION 1655,
TITLE 28, U. S. C.
William Wirt Blume*

1655 of Title 28, U.S.C. (1948) was originally section 8 of
an act of Congress approved March 3, 1875.1 A somewhat similar
statute, limited to equity cases, had been enacted in 1872.2 Paragraph
one of the present section reads:
"In an action in a district court to enforce any lien upon or
claim to, or to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the
title to, real or personal property within the district, where any defendant cannot be served within the State, or does not voluntarily
appear, the court may order the absent defendant to appear or
plead by a day certain."

S

ECTION

This paragraph is part of the first sentence of section 8 of the Act of
1875 with only one substantial change: The original section authorized
the proceeding when "one or more of the defendants therein shall not
be an inhabitant of, or found within, the said district." The proceeding
is now authorized when "any defendant cannot be served within the
State." In the original section the word "suit" was used in place of
"action." The court originally designated was "circuit" court instead of
"district" court.
That the proceeding authorized by section 1655 may be quasi in
rem is indicated by the provision which empowers the court to order an
absent defendant, who cannot be served within the state, to appear or
plead. This is more clearly shown by paragraph three which provides that "any adjudication shall, as regards the absent defendant without appearance, affect only the property which is the subject of the
action."
Under section 1655, as shown by paragraph o~e, three types of
actions may be prosecuted as actions quasi in rem: (I) Actions to
enforce liens upon property. (2) Actions to enforce claims to property.

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1
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18 Stat. L. 470.
17 Stat. L. 196, 198.
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(3) Actions to remove clouds from title. Each of these types will be
considered separately. What is property, and what is property within
the district, will also be considered.
I. Enforcement of Liens

In the cases dealing with lien enforcement four general questions
have arisen: (1) May such an action be maintained in the federal district in which the property is situated without regard to the residences of
the parties? (2) Does a federal court sitting as a court of chancery
have power to render an in rem decree? (3) -May a federal court render an in personam decree in an action commenced as a proceeding
quasi in rem? ( 4) Must the lien exist before action, or may it be one
created by the action? The first three questions have been answered by
early cases, and will not require much discussion. In answering the
fourth question the courts have sometimes disagreed.
a. Venue

The federal Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that "no civil suit shall
be brought ... against an inhabitant of the United States by any original
process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or
in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ." 3 Diversity
jurisdiction was limited to suits between "a citizen of the State where
the suifis brought, and a citizen of another State."4 In 1872 the provision for diversity jurisdiction was changed so as to eliminate the requirement that one party (interpreted to mean all parties on the same
side) be a citizen of the State "where the suit is brought."11 In 1875 the
provision requiring suit where the defendant is an inhabitant or is
found was modified by adding "except as hereinafter provided."6 The
exception was section 8 of the act (now section 1655). In 1888 the
provision requiring suit where the defendant is an inhabitant or is
found was changed by eliminating the words "or in which he shall be
found," and by adding: "where the jurisdiction is founded only on the
fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be
brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or
s I Stat. L. 73.

Ibid.
17 Stat. L. 196.
a 18 Stat. L. 470.
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the defendant." 1 The Act of 1888 expressly provided that section 8
of the Act of 1875 (now section 1655) should continue in force. Section l39l(a) of Title 28 U.S.C. (1948) provides: "A civil action
wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may,
except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial
district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." One of the exceptions referred to in this section is the action quasi in rem authorized
by section 1655.
In Greeley v. Lowe (1894)8 the Supreme Court was called upon
to consider whether an action under section 8 of the Act of 1875
could be maintained in the district in which the property was situated
even though some of the defendants resided in other states. The
court held, according to the opinion of Brown, J., that section 8 "does
not enlarge the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court," but "does, however,
confer a privilege upon the plaintiff of joining in local actions defen&
ants who are non-residents of the district in which the action is
brought."
The importance of section 1655 as a venue provision is well
illustrated by Greeley v. Lowe, supra. The action was brought in
the Northern District of Florida to partition 10,016 acres of land situated in that district. The plaintiffs were citizens of New Hampshire.
The defendants (130 in number) were citizens of Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Texas, and the District of Columbia. It is clear that
the action could not have been maintained as an in personam action.
If brought where all the plaintiffs resided, service on all the defendants
in New Hampshire, while theoretically possible, was practically impossible. Furthermore, the action being a "local" action, must be
brought where the land was situated. Action where all the defendants
resided was, of course, impossible. Action in Florida where the land
was situated and where some of the defendants resided was impossible
because the other defendants were indispensable parties. The plaintiffs
solved the problem by bringing the action where the land was situated
as an action quasi in rem under section 8 of the Act of 1875.
Speaking of Ober v. Gallagher (Supreme Court, 1876),9 which
was a suit to enforce a lien upon land, Waite, C. J., stated:
125 Stat. L. 433.
8 155 U.S. 58 at 72, 15 S.Ct 24.
9 93 U.S. 199 at 205.
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"The suit is of a local nature, its object being to subject lands
in Arkansas to the payment of a debt. It must, therefore, be
brought in the district where the property is situated."
This means that an action for lien enforcement, whether in personam
or quasi in rem, must be brought in the district in which the land is
situated. Proceedings under section 1655 are expressly limited to
"property within the district." Finding it necessary to bring any action
for lien enforcement in the district in which the property is situated,
it is important to know whether residence of parties in that district is
also necessary. The answer given by Greeley v. Lowe, supra, is no.

b.

Power to Make Decrees in Rem

Rule 8 of the Federal Equity Rules of 1912 provided that if a
mandatory decree should not be complied with, the federal court
might direct that the act be done by some other person appointed by
the court. In 1938 this provision was incorporated into Rule 70 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure along with a new provision that "if real
or personal property is within the district, the court in lieu of directing
a conveyance thereof may enter a judgment divesting the title of any
party and vesting it in others and such judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law." These rules were adopted to
settle questions which had arisen from time to time concerning the
power of a federal court sitting in chancery to make a decree in rem.
The old courts of chancery had always proceeded in personam, and it
was generally believed that power to proceed in rem must be conferred
by statute. At the time Rule 8 was adopted all but four states had
such statutes,1° the earliest having been enacted in Maryland in 1785.11
The provisions of Rule 70 do not appear applicable to proceedings
quasi in rem, but only to actions in personam in which in personam
decrees have not been, or may not be, performed.
Authority for making a decree in rem in an action quasi in rem
is implicit in section 1655. This view was taken by Clark, D. J., in
Deck v. Whitman (C. C. Tennessee, 1899),12 an in personam action
to foreclose a mortgage. After a decree of foreclosure had been entered,
and the land sold by a special master, a question was raised as to the
proper method of passing title. The choice, apparently, was between
10 HusToN, THB EmioRCBMl!NT OP DBcRBils IN EQtrrrY, 21 and appendix (1915).
11 Jbid. Also see Walsh, "Development in Equity of the Power to Act in Rem,"

N.Y. UNIV. L. RBv. 4-5 (1928).
12 96 F. 873 at 888-889.
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a decree in personam requiring the defendant to make a conveyance
(to be enforced by attachment for contempt or by other coercion of the
person) and a decree in rem (either divesting and vesting title directly,
or directing the special master to make a deed). A state statute authorized the latter method, but the supreme court of the state had intimated
a doubt whether a federal court could do other than order a conveyance by a party to the suit. After a full review of the cases Judge
Clark stated:
''When the notions of a mortgage so changed that it was no
longer regarded as the conveyance of an estate upon condition,
but as mere security for the debt, creating a lien, and when the
power of sale was added, the action to foreclose by sale became
obviously one in rem, or substantially such. . . .
"Furthermore, congress has, by legislation, expressly recognized
the foreclosure suit as being one in rem, and impressed upon it the
essential features of a case of that class by conferring on the circuit
courts of the United States jurisdiction to proceed with it as a suit
of that character, giving effect to the judgment as one in rem....
Act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 470) §8...."
Judge Clark reached two conclusions: (I) That federal courts could
transfer titles in foreclosure suits because such suits had become
substantially proceedings in rem. (2) That federal courts could, if
not should, conform to state statutes which regulate the enforcement
of mortgage contracts.
Even though the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (1938) appear applicable only to actions in personam, authority to make an in rem decree in an in personam action seems to include
power to make such a decree in an action quasi in rem. Long before
the adoption of Rule 8 of the Equity Rules of 1912 federal courts
made it a practice to follow state statutes which authorized courts of
chancery to make in rem decrees. There was no statutory basis for
this practice, but if permissible then, it is permissible today. But, as
indicated above, these sources of authority are not needed. Authority
for making a decree in rem in an action quasi in rem is implicit in
section 1655.

c.

In Personam Decrees in Proceedings Quasi In Rem

When an action is brought under section 1655 in the district in
which the property is situated, may the court properly enter a personal
judgment? Three situations will be considered: (I) Where the
plaintiff seeks enforcement of a lien and also deficiency judgment.

a
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(2) Where the plaintiff must establish the debt or other obligation
secured by the lien. (3) Where some of the defendants have been
served within the state or have appeared, and others have been served
outside the state and have not appeared.
When a plaintiff seeks enforcement of a lien and also a deficiency
judgment against a nonresident defendant, his action is quasi in rem.
The prayer for a personal judgment is merely tentative or conditional.13
If the defendant does not appear, an in rem judgment enforcing the
lien is the only judgment which can be rendered. If he does appear,
the whole action will become an in personam action. A personal judgment in such a transformed action is not, strictly speaking, a personal
judgment in an action quasi in rem. It is a personal judgment in an
action which was originally quasi in rem. It should be noted that a
transformed personal action may be maintained in a district in which
it could not have been commenced.
In every case of lien enforcement the claimant must prove a
breach of the obligation secured by the lien, and the amount of debt
or damages due him as a consequence of the breach. If the court has
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, a judgment for debt or
damages is in personam, and may be collected out of any property of
the defendant subject to execution. If the court has jurisdiction over
the property covered by the lien, but not over the person of the defendant, a judgment for debt or damages can be collected only out of the
property. In the latter case, a judgment fixing the amount of debt
or damages is not a personal judgment, but is merely a part of the judgment in rem. In Campbell v. Murdock (D.C. Ohio, 1950)14 a nonresident defendant, attempting to appear specially, moved to dismiss
the action in so far as it asked for a personal judgment. The action
had been brought under section 1655 to foreclose a mechanic's li~n on
land. The pers<;>nal judgment sought was a judgment establishing the
debt which gave rise to the mechanic's lien. Jones, Ch.J., stated:
"There has been some suggestion that the personal judgment
must be limited to such relief as is related to the in rem feature of
the action which originally gives the court jurisdiction. . . .
Even with this limitation a personal judgment may be had in this
action. A personal judgment on the debt which gives rise to the
lien in this action does not seem so incidental to the foreclosure of
1a Bede Steam Shipping Co., Ltd., v. New York Trust Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 54 F.
(2d) 658.
14 90 F. Supp. 297 at 299.

1951]

AcTIONs QuAsr IN REM

7

the lien as to defeat the jurisdiction of the· court under section
1655."
The court held that the defendant by attempting to appear specially
had "appeared" within the meaning of section 1655. When an action
quasi in rem has been transformed by appearance into an action in
personam, a judgment against the defendant for the debt is an ordinary
personal judgment. When such an action has not been tran.sformed,
the judgment for the debt is not a personal judgment, and should be
designated by some other name.
Section 1655 authorizes an action quasi in rem "where any defendant cannot be served within the State, or does not voluntarily
appear." This means that if one of several defendants is a nonresident,
the whole action is classified as quasi in rem for the purposes of venue.
As to the nonresident defendant the action continues to be quasi in
rem, but as to the other defendants it is in personam. If the nonresident defendant does not appear, the judgment against him and the
other defendants for the debt is quasi in rem as to him, but in personam
as to the other defendants. · In other words, an action under section
1655 may be quasi in rem for the purposes of venue, and both quasi in
rem and in personam for the purposes of judgment.
d. Pre-existing Liens
When a lien on specified property has been created by contract or
by steps taken under a statute, the lien is thought of as existing independently of any action brought to enforce it. Such a lien is referred
to as a pre-existing lien. When a lien does not exist before action,
but is applied to specified property in an action brought to enforce it,
the lien is thought of as non pre-existing.
There is nothing in the language of section 1655 which necessarily requires that a "lien upon" property be a lien which exists before
action rather than one which will be created by action. It is arguable
that an action in which a lien will be fixed upon specified property,
and then enforced, is an action "to enforce" a "lien upon" property.
A contrary view, however, was taken in the early cases, and this view
is taken by most courts today. Two types of cases will be noted briefly:
(1) Attachment and garnishment cases. (2) Creditors' bills.
Attachment and garnishment. In Dormitzer -v. Illinois & St. Louis
Bridge Co. (C.C. l\1assachusetts, J881)15 Lowell, Cir.J., stated:
15

6 F. 217 at 218.
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"It unfortunately is the case that congress has not seen fit
to entrust the circuit courts with power to proceed by attachment
of property against an absent defendant unless he is an inhabitant
of the district where the suit is brought. Toland v. Sprague, 12
Pet. 300. A recent statute gives these courts jurisdiction to enforce a lien upon or claim to, or remove an encumbrance or lien
or cloud upon the title to, real or personal property within the
district, though the defendants, or some of them, may not be
either inhabitants thereof or found therein, first giving notice to
the absent defendants. St. 1875, c. 137, §8; 18 St. 472. But this
means a lien or title existing anterior to the suit, and not one
caused by the institution of the suit itself. These courts, therefore,
have a very limited jurisdiction by foreign attachment...."
This statement has been cited in many cases, and seems to have discouraged later attempts to bring attachment or garnishment under section 8 of the Act of 1875. Attempts to sustain such proceedings under
an Act of 1872, which authorized attachment and other state remedies
in actions at law,16 have not been successful.11 In Davis 11. EnsignBickford Co. (8th Cir. 1944)1 8 the court held that the attachment
and garnishment provisions of Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
(1938) do not authorize attachment of property of nonresidents. In
this case Thomas, Cir.J., stated:
"In the federal courts attachment is but an incident to a suit,
and unless the court has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant the attachment must fall. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired
by means of attachment. In the absence of an existing lien on
property within the jurisdiction of the court a federal court must
acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant before it is
authorized to attach his property or garnish his creditors."

In Rorick 11. Deven Syndicate, Ltd. (Supreme Court, 1939)1 9 "the
basic question," according to Douglas, J., was "whether a federal district court, in the absence of jurisdiction in personam and after removal
of a cause from a state court where jurisdiction in rem over certain
16 17 Stat. L. 196. The Act of 1872 provided that "in common-law causes in the
circuit and district courts • • • the plaintiff shall be entitled to similar remedies, by attachment or other process against the property of the defendant, which are now provided for by
the laws of the State in which such court is held."
17 Ex parte Railway Company, 103 U.S. 794 (1880); Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229
U.S. 31, 33 S.Ct. 694 (1912).
18 139 F. (2d) 624 at 626.
19 307 U.S. 299 at 300, 311, 59 S.Ct. 877. Noted in 25 CoRN. L.Q. 448 (1940);
18 N.C. L. REv. 51 (1939); 13 So. CAL. L. R:sv. 361 (1940).
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property of a defendant has already been acquired, can issue an order
of attachment or garnishment against other property of the same defendant." The court held that such an order may be issued. Justice
Douglas stated that the Supreme Court had "solicitously protected attachments obtained prior to removal" in pursuance of an express policy
of Congress, and, in doing so, the Court had "not adhered rigorously to
the philosophy" of the early cases. The old reasons for not allowing
attachment or garnishment without personal service being no longer
valid, it is reasonable to expect that the old rule will disappear. A
simple solution would be to eliminate the doubtful requirement that
liens enforceable under section 1655 must be pre-existing. With that
requirement out of the way, an action commenced by attachment or
garnishment would be an action to enforce a "lien upon or claim to"
property within the meaning of section ~655.
Creditors' bills. Albert 11. Bascom (D.C. Texas, 1917)20 was brought
by citizens of Maryland and Idaho against citizens of Kentucky to
establish a lien upon, or claim to, property situated in Texas. After a
review of Texas cases dealing with the question of whether creditors
of a decedent have liens upon specific property, Judge West stated:
"The effect of these decisions conclusively show that the
plaintiffs' right of action as general creditors having claims against
property of a decedent debtor invoking the general statutory lien
is one in personam, and not in rem. . . .
"The lien must have existed anterior to the suit. . ~ . Dorrnitzer v. Illinois Bridge Co. (C.C. Mass. 1881). . . . The
action is not one to enforce a specific lien upon specific property
existing prior to the suit as contemplated by the statute."

Spellman v. Sullivan (D.C. New York, 1930)21 was a judgment
creditor's bill to reacp. equitable assets. Patterson, D. J., stated:
"In my opinion, a creditor's bill brought by a judgment creditor with execution returned nulla bona, to reach equitable assets
of the judgment debtor, is a suit to enforce an 'equitable lien upon' property within the scope of Section 57.... The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the filing of a bill by a judgment
creditor creates a lien in equity on the equitable assets of the judgment debtor. . . .
"I am of the opinion also that a creditor's bill is a suit to enforce
an equitable 'claim' to property. From the moment that execution
20 245 F. 149
2 1 43 F. (2d)

at 154-155.
762 at 764. Noted in 29

MicH.

L. REv. 942 (1931).
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has been returned unsatisfied, the judgment creditor has a claim
to the equitable assets of the judgment debtor. His claim is not
merely one in personam against the debtor; he had that claim
before judgment. He has a claim quasi in rem against surplus
trust income and any other property not subject to execution at
law, which claim he may assert and enforce by creditor's bill."
The Court ·of Appeals for the Second Circuit:22 concurred in these
views, holding that the action might be maintained under section 57 of
the Judicial Code (now section 1655 of Title 28) "even though the
lien or claim was not pre-existing before the commencement of the
suit." This departure from the view that a lien enforceable under section 1655 must have existed before suit, is unusual, but is welcome
because it shows that section 1655 can be reasonably interpreted to
apply to liens created by the commencement of suit.
2. Enforcement of Claims

In Vidal v. South American Securities Co. (2d Cir., 1922)23 Rogers,
Cir.J., undertook to define the terms "lien" and "claim" as used in the
Act of 1875:
"The term 'lien' is the right which a creditor has to obtain
satisfaction of a debt or duty out of a specified res which is owned
by another. It is a charge or incumbrance upon specific property
which is security for the payment of money or the performance
of some duty. . . .
"The term 'claim,' as used in the section, is the right to lay
claim to a specific property which is in another's possession."

In connection with these definitions reference was made to Shainwald
v. Lewis (D.C. Nevada, 1880)24 in which the court had said: "By the
words 'legal or equitable lien or claim against real or personal property,'
congress intended to reach every case in which there should be any sort
of charge upon a specific piece of property, capable of being enforced
by a court of equity." It was in this case that the requirement that the
lien or claim be •rpre-existing" was first laid down.
In the present discussion no attempt will be made to define or
delimit the term "claim to" property as used in section 1655. Instead,
some of the most familiar types of "local" actions will be discussed
briefly, along with a few other types of cases in which attempts have
been made to proceed quasi in rem.
22 61

F. (2d) 787.

2a 276 F. 855 at 870, 871.
24 5 F. 510 at 517.
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a. Ejectment and Replevin
The claim enforcement section of the Act of 1872 was limited to
suits in equity. In the Act of 1875 this limitation was omitted making
it clear that actions for legal relief may be brought under the provisions
of section 1655.
Is an action to recover possession of property an action "to enforce
any claim to . . . real or personal property" within the meaning of
section 1655? Although the answer seems plainly yes, attention is
called to Staffan v. Zeust (Court of Appeals, D. of C., 1897)25 in
which Alvey, C. J., stated:
"It would seem to be clear, that an action of ejectment in this
District is a possessory action, and that it is not a proceeding in
rem, according to any well defined conception of proceedings in
rem. It doubtless involves some of the effects of such proceedings,
but it is essentially a proceeding in personam, in which, from the
commencement or earliest history of the action, a judgment could
only be rendered against the tenant or real defendant after due
service of process and actual notice to defend."
The statute involved in this case was a special statute for the District of
Columbia (enacted in 1867)26 which provided that "publication may
be substituted for personal service of process upon any defendant who
cannot be found . ·.. in all actions at law or in eq1:1ity which have for
their immediate object the enforcement or establishment of any lawful
right, claim, or demand to or against any real or personal property
within the jurisdiction of the court." The court held that this provision "was intended to embrace proceedings in rem . . . but not . . .
cases in personam, such as the action of ejectment." The court was of
the opinion that there is no need for bringing ejectment as an action
quasi in rem. If the premises are unoccupied, the plaintiff may take
possession without legal process. If the premises are occupied, the
action may be in personam against the person in possession.
If, as stated in the Staflan Case, it is never necessary to bring an
action for possession of property as an action quasi in rem, any question
as to whether a claim made in such an action is a "claim to" property,
is purely theoretical. There is, however, at least one situation in which
an action quasi in rem may be useful, if not necessary. The situation
referred to is illustrated by Spencer v. Kansas City Stock-Yards Co.
21>

IO App. D.C. 260 at 271.

2a 14 Stat. L. 403.
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(C. C. Missouri, 1893).27 In this case the plaintiffs were residents of
California, Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas. The defendant was a
Kansas corporation. The property, situated in Missouri, was occupied
and operated by employees of the Kansas corporation. The court
quoted with approval a statement that "a servant or employee claiming
no title or interest in himself, or any right to possession, is not usually
liable in an action of ejectrnent," indicating that it would not have been
proper to bring the action against the nonresident corporation's employees. The action, being local, was of necessity brought in Missouri.
Since, however, neither the defendant nor all the plaintiffs resided in
Missouri, the only authority for venue was section 8 of the Act of 1875.
The court concluded that an "action of ejectrnent is a legal claim to
real property" within the meaning of section 8. This conclusion was
followed in Elk Garden Co. v. T. N. Thayer Co. (C.C. Virginia,
1910),28 and is the accepted view today.
Although there is some authority for holding that replevin may
not be maintained against a person who has no possession or control
except as agent or employee of another to whom the property was
delivered,29 the great weight of authority is the other way. This means
that there is little, or no, need for bringing replevin as an action quasi
in rem. If a case should arise in which an action of replevin against a
nonresident possessor (acting through agents or employees) would be
necessary, or even useful, there is no reason why it should not be
brought under section 1655.

Southern Surety Co. v. Maxwell ( 4th Cir., 1925)30 was a suit in
equity brought in West Virginia for possession of two steam shovels
operated in West Virginia by an Iowa corporation. Rose, Cir.J.,
stated:
"As the bill asserts a title to specific chattels, admittedly within
the Northern district of West Virginia, section 57 of the Judicial
Code [now Sec. 1655 of Title 28] gave venue to the court below,
irrespective of the place of residence of the parties. . . ."
Now that corporations are residents for venue purposes of the districts
in which they do business,31 venue of an action against an out-of-state
corporation occupying land or using personal property for business
27 56 F. 741 at 745.
28 179 F. 556.
29 McDougall v. Travis,

24 Hun. (31 N.Y.) 590 (1881).
so 5 F. (2d) 181 at 181.
31 Sec. 1391 of Title 28, 62 Stat. L. 935, c. 646.
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purposes can be laid where the property is situated without reliance on
section 1655 .. Where property is occupied or used by a nonresident
individual, or is merely possessed by a nonresident corporation, venue
where the property is situated, which is essential in local actions, is
authorized by section 1655.
b. Partition

An action for partition of land is local in the sense that it must be
brought in the district in which the land is situated. All part owners
of the land are indispensable parties. If all the plaintiffs or all the
defendants do not reside in the district where the land is, the only
authority for venue is section 1655. ·
Is a partition suit an action to enforce a "claim to" real property
within the meaning of section 1655? In Greeley -v. Lowe (Supreme
Court, 1894)32 Brown, J., stated:
"The bill in question is one for the partition of land, wherein
plaintiff avers that he is seized as tenant in common of an estate
in fee simple, and is in actual possession of the land described, and
after setting forth the interests of the other tenants in common,
and alleging that no remedy at law exists to enable him to obtain
his share of said lands in kind, or of the proceeds if sold, and that
he is wholly without remedy except in chancery, prays for the partition of the land, and the segregation of his own share from that
of the others, and incidentally that certain deeds may be construed
and, if invalid, may be cancelled, and that he may recover his advances for taxes and expenses. This is clearly a bill to enforce a
claim and settle the title to real estate."
The court held that the suit came within the provisions of section 8 of
the Act of 1875. It will be noted that the case did not involve a "right
to lay claim to a specific property which is in another's possession" as
required by the definition given, supra, in the Vidal Case.
c. Abatement of Nuisance
That a federal court cannot abate a nuisance outside its district ·was
held in Mississippi and Missouri R. R. Co. 11. Ward (Supreme Court,
1863).33 In Ladew 11. Tennessee Copper Co. (C. C. Tennessee,
1910)34 Sanford, D. J., stated: 'While an action to abate or restrain
32155 U.S. 58 at 72, 15 S.Ct. 24.
33 2 Black (67 U.S.) 485.
34 179 F. 245 at 253, 247, 250-252.
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a nuisance is of a local nature and can only be maintained in a district
having the proper territorial jurisdiction, the venue of such action is
the district where the nuisance itself is located."
In the Ladew Case the plaintiffs were citizens of New York and
West Virginia. One defendant was a New Jersey corporation; the
other, a British corporation. The nuisance was located in Tennessee.
The plaintiffs were injured in Georgia. The plaintiffs alleged that
-they were possessed of "a right and claim in, to, and against the lands
and tenements of the defendants in the nature of an easement thereupon" that the same should not be used in a manner to injure or
destroy lands and forests of the plaintiffs situated in Georgia. Referring to section 8 of the Act of 1875 (now section 1655) Judge Sanford
said:

"It is clear that this section does not extend either to all suits
of a local nature or to all local actions in rem or in the nature of
proceedings in rem, but is definitely limited to suits brought for
the enforcement of certain specific rights. . . . The right to have
a nuisance on another's property restrained or abated is not based
upon an assertion of title to such property, or of any proprietary
interest therein, or right or claim to the property itself. . . .
"Nor can this result be changed by reason of the fact that as a
suit for the abatement of a nuisance is a local action which can
only be brought in the district where the nuisance is located (Mississippi and M. R.R. Co v. Ward, supra), in such a suit between
citizens of different states, where neither of the parties reside in
the district where the nuisance is located, the action not being
maintainable under section 8 of the act of 1875, there is no jurisdiction in any Circuit Court of the United States except upon a
waiver of the defendant of the want of jurisdiction in the particular district."
The Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal for want of jurisdiction,3 11
concurring in the view that a claim to have a nuisance abated is not a
"claim to" real property within the meaning of the Act of 1875.
The holding in the Ladew Case means that a diversity case to
abate a nuisance must be brought as an action in personam in the district in which the nuisance is located, yet cannot be maintained there
unless all the defendants reside in the district, or all the plaintiffs reside
35 218

U.S. 357, 31 S.Ct. 81 (1910).
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there, and the defendants can be served within the state. 36 Where a
nuisance arises out of business done by an out-of-state corporation
within the district, the corporation will be deemed a resident of the district for venue purposes, and therefore can be sued there in personam.
But where a nuisance is being maintained by a nonresident individual
through agents or employees, an action against the nonresident cannot
be maintained. And where land or a structure, owned by a nonresident corporation or individual, constitutes a nuisance, the nuisance
cannot be abated in a federal court. There is need for an action quasi
in rem.

d. Enforcement of Trusts

In Goodman v. Niblack (1880)37 the Supreme Court held that the
beneficiary of a trust could not maintain an action to enforce the trust
against money in the hands of an administrator without joining the
trustees, citizens of another state, as parties to the suit. It was pointed
out, however, since the proceeding was "to enforce a lien on the fund
which is within reach of the court" the trustees might be served by
publication under section 8 of the Act of 1875 (now section 1655).
This means that an action to enforce a trust may be maintained as an
action quasi in rem in the district in which the trust res is found.

Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co. (10th Cir., 1940)38 was "an
action to impress a trust on real and personal property with a fixed situs
in the Northern and Western Districts of Oklahoma." The court held
that the action was properly brought in one of the districts, citing section 118 of Title 28 (now section 1392) which provided that a "local
action" involving property of a fixed character, lying partly in one district and partly in another, might be brought in the district court of
either district. If an action to enforce a trust is a "local action" it has
become so because it may be maintained as an action quasi in rem
under section 1655. At the time of Massie v. Watts (Supreme Court,
1810)39 such a suit was thought of as analogous to a transitory action of
the common law.
36 In Clarke v. Boysen, (10th Cir. 1930) 39 F. (2d) 800 at 815, the court held that
"relief by way of mandatory injunction to abate . . • nuisance" must be in personam; and
that service under the section which is now 1655 is not sufficient.
87102 U.S. 556.
88 112 F. (2d) 940 at 943.
ao 6 Cranch (IO U.S.) 148.
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Specific Performance

Single 11. Scott Paper Mfg. Co. (C. C. Ohio, 1893)40 was a suit for
specific performance of a contract to convey land situated in the district
in which the action was commenced. The plaintiff was a resident of
New York. The defendants were residents of Michigan. Ricks, D. J.,
after holding that a federal court exercising general equity jurisdiction
might enforce any additional remedies given by state law, said:
"If the laws of Ohio provide a remedy through which the performance of such a contract can be enforced, as against a nonresident, then such an existing contract in Ohio is an equitable 'claim'
to real estate, which this court may enforce, or an 'incumbrance or
cloud upon a title to real property,' which this court may remove,
under the provisions of the United States statute [Act of 1875] to
which reference has heretofore been made."

Ohio statutes tlien in force authorized actions for specific performance;
authorized service by publication; and provided that "when a party
against whom a judgment for a conveyance . . . is rendered does not
comply therewith by the time appointed, such judgment shall have
the same operation and effect, and be as ·available, as if the conveyance
. . . . had been executed conformably to such judgment."
In Dan Cohen Realty Co. 11. National Savings & Trust Co. (6th
Cir., 1942)41 "the sole question for decision" was whether the District
Court for Eastern Kentucky might entertain a civil action "for specific
performance of an informal agreement, reached by correspondence in
writing, for the renewal lease of land within the district" brought by an
Ohio corporation against citizens of the District of Columbia. The
district court dismissed for want of venue. The court of appeals affirmed.
· The appellate, court recognized that specific performance of a contract
to make a lease may be decreed in proper cases, but held that such an
action is in personam, and "cannot reasonably be construed to be a
'claim to' real property" within the meaning of section 57 of the Judicial Code (now section 1655 of Title 28). Martin, Cir.J., stated:
"In so far as Single v. Scott Paper Mfg. Co., C.C., 55 F. 553,
urged upon us by appellant, construes a suit for specific performance of a contract to convey land as bringing the action within the
sweep of Section 57, we are constrained to the opposite view.
40
41

55 F. 553 at 557.
125 F. (2d) 288 at 289, 290.
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"We agree with the District Court that Rule 70 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, does not
establish venue in the case at bar."
It will be recalled that Judge Hicks in Single v. Scott Paper Mfg.
Co. took into account an Ohio statute which authorized decrees in rem,
in reaching his conclusion that a claim for specific performance of a
contract to convey land is a "claim to" real property within the meaning
of section 8 of the Act of 1875 (now section 1655). In the Dan Cohen
Realty Co. case the court completely ignored a Kentucky statute which
authorizes decrees in rem,42 and failed to give adequate consideration
to the in rem provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In
the old equity practice all equity decrees were in personam; but with
widespread adoption of statutes authorizing decrees in rem, the whole
picture changed. Under the old practice a complainant suing for
specific performance of a contract to make a lease or convey land was
seeking a decree against the defendant, that being all he could get.
Today he is seeking the land. His claim is a "claim to" land.

f. Interpleader
Section 1397 of Title 28 (1948) provides that "any civil action of
interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this
title may be brought in the judicial district in which one or more of the
claimants resides." When such an action involves a specific res, may
the action also be brought as an action quasi in rem in the district in
which the res is situated?
In strict interpleader the plaintiff is required to disclaim all interest
in the property brought before the court. In an action "in the nature
of interpleader" the plaintiff need not be wholly free from interest. In
Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co. (D.C. New York,
1916)43 the bank made a claim to a deposit, and also asked for interpleader. L. Hand, D. J., stated:
"In the strict case of a bill of interpleader the decree discharged the plaintiff upon his paying the fund into court. . . .
This cannot be done in a bill like this. The plaintiff has attempted to set up its interest in the deposit, and until that has
been decided the amount payable into court cannot be decided."
42 CAmtou.'s
48 238

CIVIL Conn OF
F. 225 at 230, 228.
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§394 (1948).
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Judge Hand indicated that under a certain rule there was "property"
in court. "If so," he continued, "it would seem to follow that, under
section 57 of the Judicial Code [now section 1655 of Title 28], this bill
would lie against nonresident obligees, which seems to me a strong
position."
3. Removal of Clouds
Courts having jutisdiction to remove clouds from title usually exercise the power by ordering the cancellation of an instrument, by ordering the giving of a release, by restraining a claimant from asserting his
claim, or perhaps by merely declaring his claim invalid. May a federal
court of the district in which property is situated, decree these various
types of relief without having jurisdiction over the persons named as
defendants to the suit?

Wilhelm v. Consolidated Oil Corporation (10th Cir., 1936)44
involved a tri-party agreement under which two Kansas corporations
were to transfer all their assets to a New York corporation or to one or
more of its controlled or subsidiary corporations. Some types of assets
(cash, securities, and accounts receivable) were transferred to the New
York corporation; some physical property (situated in Oklahoma and
other states) was transferred to a Delaware subsidiary; other physical
property (consisting of a pipe line operated in Texas, Kansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, Iowa, Indian~, and Illinois) was transferred to a
Maine subsidiary. The plaintiffs (stockholders and former stockholders of the Kansas corporations) were citizens of Kansas and Oklahoma. The defendants were the New York corporation and its Delaware and Maine subsidiaries. The action was brought in the Northern
District of Oklahoma where some of the transferred property was situated. The primary relief sought was: That the tri-party agreement and
transfers thereunder be "'adjudged and decreed to be ultra vires, unfair,
unlawful and void, and that said agreement. . . . and conveyances be
set aside, held at naught and annulled as a cloud upon the title'; that the
defendants be enjoined from claiming any interest in the properties
transferred by the [Kansas corporations]; that the court decree and
establish that said properties are the properties and assets of the stockholders of the [Kansas corporations]; that said deeds, conveyances and
transfers be delivered up and cancelled; and that a receiver be ap44

84 F. (2d) 739 at 743, 748.
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pointed.
" The New York corporation was not doing business in
Oklahoma, and could not be served there for an in personam judgment.
It did not reside there for the purposes of venue. Some of the plaintiffs resided in the district; others resided in Kansas. Although there
was complete diversity of citizenship, and a federal question had been
raised, there was no federal venue in which the action, as an action in
personam, could be maintained. The plaintiffs contended that the
action fell within section 57 of the Judicial Code (now section 1655 of
Title 28). The court of appeals held:
"This is not a suit to remove a cloud from the title to the
properties of the Prairie [Kansas] Companies affected by, and conveyed and transferred pursuant to the tri-party agreement, for the
simple reason that it is brought by the stockholders of the Prairie
Companies in their own right, and not by such companies, nor by
the stockholders thereof as a derivitive suit. . . .
"This is not a suit to enforce a legal or equitable lien upon the
properties affected by the tri-party agreement and conveyed and
transferred pursuant thereto, except as relief incidental to and
dependent on primary relief, namely the cancellation of such
agreement, conveyances and transfers, which can only be obtained
under the circumstances of this case by a decree in personam."
The court concluded that the suit did not fall within the purview of
section 57, and the venue was improperly laid in the Northern District of Oklahoma.

Carney v. Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co. (D.C. Kansas, 1933)45
involves the same tri-party agreement, and some of the same parties, as
the Wilhelm Case. The relief sought was that the tri-party agreement
and transfers of properties thereunder he set aside as clouds on the title
to property within the district, and that the property be restored to one
of the Kansas corporations. The plaintiff (a stockholder in the Kansas
corporation) was a citizen of Illinois. The defendants were the Kansas
corporations, the New York corporation and the Maine corporation.
The New York corporation did not reside in Kansas for purposes of
venue, and could not be served there for an in personam judgment.
The court refused to dismiss, holding that the action, could be main45 5 F. Supp. 304. Reference to another Camey case decided in the Northern District of Illinois in 1933 will be found in Wilhelm v. Consolidated Oil Corp., (D.C. Okla.
1935) 11 F. Supp. 444, 448.
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tained in Kansas under section 57 of the Judicial Code (now section
1655 of Title 28).
In Maya Corporation 11. Smith (D.C. Delaware, 1929)46 Morris,
D.J., stated: "A bill which seeks judicial relief from a contract, and also
relief under section 57, conditioned upon obtaining equitable relief
with respect to the contract, does not present a case under section
57. . . ." In the Carney Case the defendant contended that the
plaintiff's action was not a suit to remove cloud from title, but was
"more in the nature of a suit to set aside a tri-party contract." Judge
Hopkins replied: "It is true that the bill seeks to set aside a tri-party
· contract, but it does so only in aiding the principal prayer for relief
which is to remove as a cloud on title the conveyance of property made
in furtherance of the contract."47 In the Wilhelm Case, supra, Phillips, Cir.J., stated:
"In so far as the suit is one to set aside the tri-party agreement,
it is clearly in personam, being the equivalent of a suit for rescission upon the ground of fraud. In so far as it seeks to have the
conveyance and transfers made thereunder cancelled and delivered up, and to declare the title to be in the plaintiffs, it is
equally in personam. The court 'has no inherent power, by the
mere force of its decree, to annul a deed, or to establish a title.' "48
This statement suggests that a federal court cannot remove a cloud from
title by merely declaring that title is vested in the plaintiff. This was
true of the old courts of equity, as shown by the opinion of Gray, J., in
Hart 11. Sansom (Supreme Court, 1884)49 quoted in a note to the
Wilhelm Case. But, as pointed out earlier in this discussion, federal
courts have long entered in rem decrees in accordance with state statutes, and may do so in certain situations under Rule 70 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. When an action comes within section 1655, that
section is authority for making a decree in rem.

4. Property within the District

In the Carney and Wilhelm cases, discussed in the preceding section of this paper, a question was raised as to whether a federal court
might remove cloud from title by cancelling a conveyance of property situated partly in the court's district, and partly in other states.
32 F. (2d) 350 at 352.
5 F. Supp. 304 at 306.
84 F. (2d) 739 at 746.
49 110 U.S. 151, 3 S.Ct. 586.

46
~7
48
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In the Carney Case Judge Hopkins was of opinion that the jurisdiction
of his court could not be defeated by showing that there was other
property not subject to its jurisdiction so long as a substantial portion
of the property was within the district. In tlie Wilhelm Case Judge
Phillips stated:
"There is another reason why a decree granting the primary
relief must be had in personam. . . . While a suit may be
maintained under section 57 to set aside a conveyance of property,
all of which is located in the district of suit, or partly in that district and partly in another district in the same state, such a suit
may not be maintained under section 57, where part of the property lies beyond the state of the district of the suit."50
This holding in effect overruled the holding in the Carney Case. Paragraph three of section 1655 expressly provides that "when a part of
the property is within another district, but within the same state, such
action may be brought in either district."
What is "property" within the meaning of section 1655? In
Kohagen v. Harwood (7th Cir., 1950)51 the plaintiffs contended that
royalty to be paid by a Wisconsin manufacturer on a patented article
was "a res in the Eastern District of Wisconsin" within the meaning of
section 1655. This contention was made because the plaintiffs wished
to proceed quasi in rem against a resident of California who claimed to
be assignee of the patent. The plaintiffs conceded they could not
recover the royalties from the Wisconsin manufacturer under section
1655, but argued that "an action to have determined the interest or
partial ownership of plaintiffs in such royalty" would come within the
section. The court refused to go along with this argument, Major,
Ch.J., saying:
"As used in the instant situation, the 'claim' must be upon
property located within the court's jurisdiction, capable of being
taken over or possessed by the court."
The court held that a debt is not property within the meaning of section 1655 even when the purpose of the action is to determine the
ownership of the debt.
The general test laid down .in the Kohagen Case can be applied
without difficulty when the property involved is land or tangible personal property. Application becomes more difficult when the property
50 84 F. (2d) 739 at 747.
51185 F. (2d) 276 at 277,

278.
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involved has no specific, physical existence. Is a share of corporate
stock, as distinguished from a stock certificate, "capable of being taken
over or possessed" by a court? What about a bank deposit? Rights
under a patent? A news franchise? A chose in action? Where there
is tangible evidence of a debt such as a promissory note, a certificate of
deposit, or a bond, the evidence can be "taken over or possessed" by a
court. The same is true of a certificate of corporate stock. A share of
corporate stock cannot be "taken over or possessed" nor can a bank
deposit, yet both have been held to be property within the meaning
of section 1655. Patent rights, a news franchise, and a bare chose in
action have been held to fall outside the statute.62
If, as recognized in the Kohagen Case, a bank deposit is a "res"
having a fixed situs, it is difficult to see why other debts should be
treated differently. 63 • When there are conB.icting claims to a debt, a
claimant should be permitted to have clouds removed from his title by
an action under section 1655. A debt may have a situs where the
debtor is found. There is no reason why an action quasi in rem to
remove clouds should not be combined with an action in personam to
recover the debt.

5. Effect of Special Appearance
Paragraph three of section 1655 provides that "any adjudication
shall, as regards the absent defendant without appearance, affect only
52 Manning v. Berdan, (C.C. N.J. 1904) 132 F. 382 (promissory notes); Vidal v.
South American Securities Co., (2d Cir. 1921) 276 F. 855 (boncls); Bede Steam Shipping
Co. v. New York Trust Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 658 (certificates of indebtedness and cash); Blake v. Foreman Bros. Banking Co., (D.C. ill. 1914) 218 F. 264 (certificates of corporate stock); Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U.S. 1, 20 S. Ct. 559
(1900) (shares of corporate stock); Spellman v. Sullivian, (2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 787
(income from trust); Omaha Nat. Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, (8th Cir. 1928) 26 F.
(2d) 884 (bank deposit); Standard Stoker Co. v. Lower, (D.C. Md. 1931) 46 F. (2d)
678 (patent rights); Lawrence v. Times Printing Co., (C.C. Wash. 1898) 90 F. 24 (news
franchise); Murphy v. Ford Motor Co., (D.C. Ohio 1916) 241 F. 134 (choses in action).
In the last named case the action was by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside an assignment
of a debt.
53 In Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Kelby, (2d Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 105 at 116, Frank,
Cir. J., stated: "Appellant seems to argue that the restoration action against Manhattan in
the bankruptcy court is not quasi in rem because it does not relate to a res, on the ground
that it merely seeks a money decree 'in personam' against Manhattan as trustee, and that
a 'right' which is 'in personam' cannot be a 'res.' That is a mistaken notion, based on a
play upon the unfortunate vagueness of the Latin word 'res,' a vagueness which would be
even more apparent if the word were Englished (or Americanized) and called a 'thing.'
But no matter how inadequate 'res' may be as a descriptive label, it is not true that a
money claim 'in personam' cannot be a 'res.' It seems clear, for instance, that in a suit
'quasi in rem' under §57 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. §118, an 'in personam' money
claim of Jones against Smith (such as a promissory note or open account liability of Smith
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the property which is the subject of the action." A necessary implication of this provision is that when an absent defendant makes an
"appearance" an in personam judgment may be rendered against him.
In Bede Steam Shipping Co. v. New York Trust Co. (D.C. New
York, 1931)114 the court held that a plaintiff in a foreclosure case might
properly make an in personam claim for a deficiency judgment against
an absent defendant on the chance that the defendant might appear.
With respect to appearance Woolsey, D.J., said:
"There is, I think, no middle course, as was suggested at the
argument, whereby a defendant, served, as here, outside the district, may come in and appear to defend his interest in the res
without appearing generally and subjecting himself to any other
relief which may be appropriate in the action."
In McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co. ( 4th Cir., 1940)55 the
defendants moved to strike from the plaintiffs' bill all matters sounding
in personam so the court's jurisdiction would be limited to claims in
rem. The ·trial court granted this motion, holding that the defendants'
appearance was a special, not a general, appearance. The court of
appeals affirmed, Dobie, Cir.]., stating:
"As the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and
as there are many federal statutes dealing with these courts in
such fields as venue and process and jurisdiction, it is highly
important that litigants should be permitted to raise many seemingly technical questions by a special appearance in limine; and
it would indeed be an unfair attitude were the federal courts,
under such circumstances, too prone to treat a special appearance
as a general appearance....
"We think the appearance of the appellees here, to move that ·
the jurisdiction of the court be limited to in rem proceedings
against the stock of the National Cash Register Company, was, in
both law and fact, a special appearance. . . . While some of the
language of Judge Woolsey in Bede Steam Shipping Company v.
New York Trust Company, D.C., 54 F.2d 658, may be opposed
to these views, we are not disposed to follow that language."

In Campbell 11. Murdock (D.C. Ohio, 1950)56 the absent defendant,
appearing specially and for the purpose of challenging the court's
'owned' by Jones) can be a res if a third person, Robinson, is seeking to enforce a lien
upon it."
54 54 F. (2d) 658 at 662.
55 112 F. (2d) 877 at 881, 882.
56 90 F. Supp. 297 at 299.
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jurisdiction, moved to dismiss the action in so far as it asked for a personal judgment; and, appearing solely for the purpose of defending
her interest in the property, moved for a more definite statement of
claim. The court held that an absent defendant cannot make a special
appearance for the limited purpose of defending his interest in the
property before the court. After referring to the views expressed by
Judge Woolsey in the Bede Case, supra, Jones, Ch.J.,. stated:.
"This statute [section 1655], it is true, limits the situations in
which the court has in rem jurisdiction. But the statute does not
prohibit the taking of personal judgments if the defendant appears, and it also provides, if the defendant does not appear, that
the court's adjudication shall affect only the property before it.
This leaves the inference that if the defendant does appear, the
court may try the entire controversy between the parties."
This conclusion seems correct. Otherwise, a rionresident could defend
the action on the merits, and, later, in an action to recover a deficiency,
could defend on the merits a second time. This unnecessary duplication should be avoided.

6.

Local Actions and Actions In Rem

In the old courts of common law a plaintiff was required to "lay"
his action in a particular county, and to allege the particular place
(parish, vill, or hamlet) at which each traverseable fact occurred. The
defendant in his pleadings was required to make similar specifications
of place. When an issue of fact was formed the jurors were summoned
from the place alleged as the place in which the particular fact occurred.
Fortescue, writing in the years 1468-1471, stated that of the twelve
jurors "at least four shall be of the hundred in which the vill is situated wherein the fact is alleged to have occurred."57 By this time the
old practice under which jurors decided cases from their own knowledge had largely disappeared. After 1705 jurors were summoned from
the county in which the action was ''laid."58
When a cause of action arose partly in one county and partly in
another, the plaintiff could lay his action in either county. If it arose
partly in a foreign country and partly. in an English county, it could
be laid in the English county. But when it arose entirely in a foreign
country there was no English county in which the action could be laid.
LAunrnus LEGUM ANcLIAE, Chrunes ed., c. 25, p. 59 (1942).
58 BLAcKST. CoMM. (Cooley, 4th ed. by Andrews 1899), IV, 350.

57 DB
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In Roberts 11. Harnage (King's Bench, 1704)59 the court suggested that
an action on a bond executed outside England might be maintained in
England if the plaintiff should allege that it was executed at the foreign
place "viz." or "towit" in a certain English county. By using this fiction
the plaintiff could lay his action in any English ,c9unty. After the
fiction was developed its use was not limited to causes of action which
arose outside the country. It could be used in certain types of actions
regardless of where the cause arose. The chief problem was to determine these types. The fiction was never available in the real actions,
nor in the mixed actions such as ejectment, but was available in all
types of personal actions except replevin, debt for arrears of a rent
charge when based on privity of estate, covenants running with land
based on privity of estate, trespass to land, and actions against innkeepers based on local customs. An action in which the fiction could
be used was called a "transitory" action. All other actions were called
"local" actions.60 The venue of a "transitory" action could be laid in
any county selected by the plaintiff. The venue of a "local" action must
be laid in the county in which the cause of action arose.
Although by use of the fiction the plaintiff could lay a "transitory"
action in any county, the defendant could have the venue changed
by making a positive affidavit that the plaintiff's cause of action arose
in another specified county. When it appeared that the action arose
wholly in the county specified by the defendant, the venue was usually
changed to that county.
.
In selecting the venue of a civil action under the English common
law it was necessary to take into account three necessities: (1) Necessity of having jurors who knew the facts of their own knowledge.
(2) Necessity of having the defendant before the court when the
ob3ect of the action was to obtain a personal judgment. (3) Necessity
of being able to reach and control property when the object of the
action was to obtain a judgment in rem or one which must be executed
in rem.
As already noted, the necessity of having jurors who knew the facts
of their own knowledge had largely disappeared by the end of the
1400's. Permission to use the transitory fiction shows that there was no
such. necessity at the beginning of the 1700's. By this time the practice
of proving cases by evidence produced in court was fully developed.
59 2 Salk. 659,
60 See Wicker,

91 Eng. Rep. 561.
''The Development of the Distinction Between Local and Transitory
Actions," 4 TENN. L. REv. 55 (1925).
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The necessity of having the defendant before the court for an in
personam judgment was at all times a real necessity. But it was not
necessary to lay the action in the county in which the defendant could
be found. He could be brought before the court from any place in
England. It was only when the defendant was outside the country
that the necessity of having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant affected the place of trial. If jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant could not be obtained in England a personal judgment could
not be rendered in England.
As to the necessity of being able to reach and control property for
the purposes of a proceeding in rem, Lord Mansfield stated: 61
"There is a formal and a substantial distinction as to the
locality of trials. I state them as different things: the substantial
distinction is, where the proceeding is in rem, and where the effect
of the judgment cannot be had, if it is laid in a wrong place. That
is the case of all ejectments, where possession is to be delivered
by the sheriff of the county; and as trials in England are in particular counties, the officers are county officers; therefore the
judgment could not have effect, if the action was not laid in the
proper county....
"But there is likewise a formal distinction, which arises from
the mode of trial; for trials in England being by jury, and the
kingdom being divided into counties, and each county considered
as a separate district or principality, it is absolutely necessary
that there should be some county where the action is brought in
particular, that there may be a process to the sheriff of that county,
to bring a jury from thence to try it."
The distinction here made is the modern distinction between actions
in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem. When a judgment
will directly affect the title to property or must be executed against
specified property, the property must be within the reach of the court.
Property in one English county was not within the reach of a court
sitting as a court of another English county. Property outside England
was beyond the reach of an English court.
Referring to the organization of the federal courts under the Judiciary Act of 1789, Justice Washington on circuit stated: 62
"This division and appointment of particular Courts, for each
District, necessarily confines the jurisdiction of the local tribunals,
61 Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (King's Bench, 1774)
62 Ex parte Peter Graham, (C.C. Pa. 1818)

1 Cowp, 161 at 176, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021.
3 Wash. Rep. 456 at 459.
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within the bounds of the respective Districts, within which they
are directed to be holden. Were it otherwise, and the Court of
one District, could send compulsory process into any other, so as
to draw to itself a jurisdiction over persons, or things, without the
limits of the District, there would result a clashing of jurisdiction
between those Courts, which could not easily be adjusted; and an
oppression upon suitors, too intolerable to be endured."
At the time this statement was made (1818) there were only two statutory provisions which authorized a federal court to send its process
outside its district: (I) Act of 1793 providing that subpoenas for witnesses might "run into any other district" but not farther than 100
miles from the place of trial. 63 (2) Act of 1797 providing that "all writs
of execution upon any judgment obtained for the use of the United
States, in any of the.courts of the United States in one state, may run
and be executed in any other state, or in any of the territories of the
United States."64 A statute enacted in 1826 provided that where a
state had been divided into two federal districts, writs of execution
might run and be executed in any part of the state.65 Each federal
district was, and still is to a large extent, a separate "principality."
Massie v. Watts (Supreme Court, 1810)66 was brought in the district of Kentucky by a citizen of Virginia to compel the defendant, a
citizen of Kentucky, to convey to plaintiff 1000 acres of land located in
the state of Ohio. The trial court ordered the conveyance. The Supreme
Court affirmed. Counsel for the defendant argued that the action was
in the "nature of a real action, which is local," and, therefore, the federal court sitting in Kentucky had no jurisdiction. Counsel for plaintiff
argued: "The action is in personam, not in rem. The remedy sought
is, a decree that the defendant should convey the land to the plaintiff.
If the defendant refuses to perform the decree, the compulsory process
is in personam, by way of attachment for a contempt of court. The
whole and original jurisdiction of a court of equity is in personam, and
not in rem." Marshall, C.J., stated:
"If we reason by analogy from the distinction between actions
local and transitory at common law, this action would follow the
person, because it would be founded on an implied contract, or
on neglect of duty. If we reason from those principles which are
68

l Stat. L. 333.
Stat. L. 512.
Stat. L. 184.
Cranch (IO U.S.) 148 at 155, 162, 159.

64 l
65 4
66 6
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laid down in the books relative to the jurisdiction of ·courts of
equity, the jurisdiction of the court of Kentucky is equally sustainable, because the defendant, if liable, is either liable under his
contract, or.as trustee."

If the action had been by a person having a prior equity against one
having a senior patent, there would have been, according to the chief
justice, "much reason for considering it as a local action." But "in a
case of fraud, or trust, or of contract, the jurisdiction of a court of
chancery is sustainable, wherever the person be found, although lands
not within the jurisdiction of that court may be affected by the decree."
It was not suggested that the court sitting in Kentucky could directly
affect the Ohio land either by decree or by execution in rem.
·
The language quoted from the Massie Case, supra, illustrates in
striking fashion the unfortunate confusion which existed in the federal
courts between the local-transitory distinction of the early common law,
and the in personam-in rem distinction referred to by Lord Mansfield.
The local-transitory distinction had long been obsolete, and had no
place whatever in the statutory system of venue established by the
Judiciary Act of 1789. The in personam-in rem distinction was a
necessary distinction due to the territorial limits which had been placed
on the jurisdiction of e~ch federal court. Even without these limitations, it would have been necessary to distinguish cases against persons
or property within the United States from cases against persons or
property outside the-United States.
Livingston v. Jefferson ( C. C. Virginia, 181 i ) 67 was an action by
a citizen of New York against a citizen of Virginia for trespass to. land
•situated in the territory of Orleans. Tyler, D.J., found it difficult to
believe that lawyers would seriously argue that the court had jurisdiction. Actions for trespass to land had been "local" actions for centuries.
Arguments to the contrary seemed more or less absurd. Chief Justice
Marshall, sitting as circuit justice, concurred with Judge Tyler in holding that the court could not take jurisdiction of an in personam "local"
action involving property outside its district, but did so with hesitation
and obvious reluctance. After referring to Lord Mansfield as "one of
the greatest judges who ever sat on any bench," Justice Marshall stated:
"In the case of Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 166, Lord Mansfield stated the true distinction between proceedings which are in
rem, in which the effect of a judgment cannot be had, unless the
67fed. Case No. 8, 411, 15 Fed. Cas. 660 at 664.
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thing lie within the reach of the court, and proceedings against
the person where damages only are demanded. But this opinion
was given in an action for a personal wrong which is admitted to
be transitory. It has not, therefore, the authority to which it would
be entitled, had this distinction been laid down in an action
deemed local."
While it is clear that the great Chief Justice was dissatisfied with the
rule which required actions for trespass to land to be brought where
the land was situated, due to the possibility that no action at all could
be maintained, it is not clear that he thought the local-transitory distinction should be abandoned entirely. It seems strange that the most
obvious solution of the Livingston Case was not discussed. As pointed
out above, the system of venue established for the federal courts was
strictly statutory. The in personam-in rem distinction was inherent in
the system due to territorial limitations on jurisdiction. The localtransitory distinction was not inherent, and should not have been imported by judicial decision. By merely following the venue statute the
court would have reached a result which according to Marshall, and
Mansfield before him, would have been the right result.
In Casey v. Adams (Supreme Court, 1880)68 Waite, C.J., stated:
''The distinction between local and transitory actions is as old
as actions themselves, and no one has ever supposed that laws
which prescribed generally where one should be sued, included
such suits as were local in their character, either by statute or the
common law, unless it was expressly so declared. Local actions
are in the nature of suits in rem, and are to be prosecuted where
the thing on which they are founded is situated."

If all local actions were actions in rem or quasi in rem, and could be
maintained where the property is situated under section 1655 of Title
28, there would be little objection to the view expressed by Chief Justice Waite that the common-law distinction between local and transitory
actions should be read into the federal venue statutes.
We have seen, however, that some local actions, e.g., trespass to
land, are not in rem. This means they must be brought where the res
is situated and also where all the defendants reside or where all the
plaintiffs reside and the defendants can be served. If the required
venues do not coincide, no action can be maintained. By refusing to
68102 U.S. 66 at 67-68.
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read into the federal venue statutes the local-transitory distinction, this
type of difficulty can be avoided.
In Ladew 11. Tennessee Copper Co. (C.C. Tennessee, 1910)69
Sanford, D.J., referring to section 8 of the Act of 1875 (predecessor
of section 1655 of Title 28), stated:
"It is clear that this section does not extend either to all suits
of a local nature or to all local actions in rem or in the nature of
.
. rem.... "
proceedmgs
m
This being true, it is obvious that there is a serious Haw in the federal
venue system. Where an action is local according to the common-law
distinction, or is in rem in the sense that the judgment will directly
affect property or must be executed against specific property, the action
must be brought in the district of the res, yet it cannot be brought
there unless it comes within the terms of section 1655, or unless all
the defendants reside in the district or all the plaintiffs reside there
and the defendants can be served within the state. For local actions
and actions in rem falling outside section 1655 there is no federal venue
except when the location of the res and the residences of the plaintiffs
or defendants happen to coincide.
For the difficulties indicated above, three remedies are suggested:
( l) The obsolete common-law distinction between local and transitory actions should be completely and finally abandoned.
(2) Section 1655 should be expanded to include all actions for
judgments in rem or for judgments which must be executed in rem.
(3) Until expanded as suggested in (2), section 1655 should be
construed to include as many actions as possible.
In connection with the third suggestion attention is called to a
comment made by Judge Woolsey in Bede Steam Shipping Co. v. New
York Trust Co. (D.C. New York, 1931): 70
"Finally, it must be remembered that Sec. 118 [now section
1655] is a remedial statute which seeks to obviate within a very
narrow zone the inconvenience to litigants of our many territorial
subdivisions and thus promote the administration of justice. Consequently, it 'should be liberally construed to accomplish the end
. view.
. ,"
m
7. Change of Venue and Enforcement of Judgments
Rules governing the place of trial within a particular sovereignty,
whether thought of as rules of venue or limitations on territorial juris69
10

I 79 F. 245 at 250.
54 F. (2d) 658 at 662.
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diction, are merely rules of procedure. In fixing the place of trial, one,
and only one, guiding principle should be followed, viz., convenience.
The place fixed should be that most convenient for the parties, for
their witnesses, and for the court itself.
It is impossible to determine by general rule where it will be convenient to try some future case. On the other hand, there must be some
rule which prescribes a place for the commencement of a particular
type of action. In an earlier discussion of place of trial71 the present
writer suggested that there should be a return to the common-law rule
that an action should be tried in the place in which the cause of action
or a part thereof arose. The thought was that the place of occurrence
is that most likely to prove convenient. It was recognized, however,
that convenience cannot be determined in advance, and therefore any
rule fixing the place of commencement should be accompanied by a
liberal provision for change of venue.
A new provision of Title 28 U.S.C. (1948) reads: 72
"For the convenience of p~rties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought."
That this provision was needed has been demonstrated by the many
instances in which parties have sought its application. Although too
narrow in that it restricts the transfer of a case to a "district or division
where it might have been brought," the section points the way to a
rational system of federal venue.
Another new provision of Title 28 is found in section 1963:
"A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property entered in any district court which has become final by appeal
or expiration of time for appeal may be registered in any other
district by filing therein a certified copy of such judgment. A judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the
district court of the district where registered and may be enforced
in like manner." 73
It will be noted that this provision applies to judgments for the recovery
of "property," as well as for the recovery of "money." Now that a
judgment for "property" entered by one district court can be enforced
71 Blume, "Place of Trial of Civil Cases," 48 MxcH.
12 Sec. 1404(a).
73 A comment on

L. REv. I at 39 (1949).

this section entitled ''The New Federal Judgment Enforcement Procedure" will be found in 50 CoL. L. REv. 971 (1950).
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by another district court, there is no need for requiring that an action
in rem or quasi in rem be brought in the district in which the property
is situated.
After a period of experience under the new provisions mentioned
above, we may hope to see a fundamental revision of the whole scheme
for federal venue. The doctrine of convenience will be emphasized
and fully developed in the cases which will arise under section 1404.
Experience under section 1963 will show that a judgment need not
be rendered in the district in which it may or must be enforced. The
hoped-for scheme will be simple and rational. Convenience will be
the single guide.

